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CASENOTES

BOWERS v. HARDWICK:* THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GEORGIA'S SODOMY
STATUTE
The United States Constitution has been interpreted to provide
a fundamental right of privacy which protects individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusions.' This fundamental right has
been extended to family-related matters,2 marriage,' and procreation.' In Bowers v. Hardwick,5 the United States Supreme Court was
* 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
1. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564.(1969). The Court recognized the right
of privacy in Stanley, stating that there is a fundamental right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one's privacy, except in very limited circumstances. Id. The Court further stated that:
[T]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United Stated, 277 U.S.438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
2. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (city ordinance
which limited the dwelling occupancy to closely related individuals was an unconstitutional invasion of the fundamental right of family choice); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parent's decision to withhold their child from compulsory
school attendance was upheld as parents have a fundamental right to decide on a
child's education); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (there is a realm of
family life which the state cannot enter without substantial justification); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state cannot interfere with the liberty to direct
the upbringing and education of a child by enforcing a statute requiring children to
attend public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute restricting the teaching of a foreign language to a child invades the child's fundamental right
of liberty).
3. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state statute requiring child
support payments as a prerequisite to a marriage license violated an individual's fundamental right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia statute
criminalizing inter-racial marriage held to be unconstitutional).
4. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (law prohibiting
the advertisement or display of contraceptives imposes on the fundamental right to
bear or beget children and must be justified by a compelling state interest); Planned
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asked to decide whether the fundamental right of privacy, given to
family-related matters, extends to the homosexual act of sodomy. If
so, a Georgia law criminalizing consensual sodomy would be unconstitutional.' The Court, utilizing an unduly restrictive analysis of
fundamental rights, held that the Constitution does not bestow
upon homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy.7 There-

fore, the Court upheld the Georgia statute criminalizing consensual
sodomy.8
Michael Hardwick was charged in 1982 with violating a Georgia
statutes which criminalized the consensual act of sodomy.10 Hardwick was arrested in the bedroom of his own home where he was
engaging in the act of sodomy." After a preliminary hearing, the
charges against Hardwick were dismissed."'
Hardwick then brought suit against Georgia's Attorney General
in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy
was unconstitutional. s Hardwick contended that the Georgia statParenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spousal consent for abortion
not required during the first trimester of pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (a woman has a fundamental right to decide whether to have an abortion, as it
affects her self-definition); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (fundamental
right of single people to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (fundamental right of married couples to use contraceptives); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state statute sterilizing multiple criminal offender is
an unconstitutional deprivation of the fundamental right to beget children).
5. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
6. Id. at 2843.
7. Id. The Court stated that none of the cases cited by the circuit court "bears
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts
of sodomy. Id. at 2843-44. The Court also stated that "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand, and homosexuality on the other has
been demonstrated by the court of appeals or by respondent." Id. at 2846.
8. Id. at 2846.
9. Michael Hardwick was charged with violating the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, § 16-6-2(a) (1984), which states that "[a] person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202,
1204 (11th Cir. 1985).
10. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
11. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204. The Atlanta Police arrested Michael Hardwick
on August 3, 1982, when he engaged in the act of sodomy with a consenting male
adult in the bedroom of his own home. Id.
12. Id. Charges were brought against Hardwick as a result of the arrest. Id.
After a preliminary hearing in the Municipal Court of Atlanta, the District Attorney's
Office stated that the case would not be presented to a grand jury unless further
evidence could be obtained against Hardwick. Id.
13. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204. Hardwick named Michael Bowers, Attorney
General of Georgia, Lewis Slayton, District Attorney for Fulton County, and George
Napper, Public Safety Commissioner of Atlanta, as defendants in his complaint. Id.
Hardwick stated that he was a homosexual, engaged in homosexual acts, and would
continue to do so in the future. Id. John and Mary Doe, a married couple acquainted
with Hardwick, brought a suit stating that they desired to engage in sodomy, but had
been deterred after the recent arrest of Hardwick. Id. The district court dismissed
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ute infringed upon his fundamental rights of privacy and intimate
association.1 4 The district court, relying on the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the
City of Richmond,15 which upheld the constitutionality of a similar
Virginia sodomy statute, 6 granted the defendant's motion to

dismiss. 17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded, 6 stating that Doe was distinguishable 9 and
that later Supreme Court decisions had undermined the holding in
Doe.'0 Relying on privacy case law, 2' the Eleventh Circuit held that
the Doe's complaint for lack of a justiciable controversy. Id. The district court stated
that "the Does are unable to show that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the statute's enforcement." Id. Because the Does could not show any immediate danger or direct injury, the district
court dismissed their complaint. Id. at 18. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's judgment dismissing the Doe's claim for lack of standing. Hardwick, 760 F.2d
at 1206-1207. The Does did not challenge that holding in the Supreme Court. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842, n.2.
14. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210-1211.
15. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
16. The district court stated that the Virginia statute, V.A. CODE 18.1-212
(1950), which defines sodomy as:
Crimes against nature-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any
brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the annus or by
the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one
year nor more than three years.
is quite similar to Georgia's statute in question and that all constitutional arguments
made by Hardwick were rejected in Doe. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2842, n. 1-2.
17. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842. The three defendants, Michael Bowers, Lewis
Slayton, and George Napper, all filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Id.
18. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial to determine if the
State of Georgia could show a compelling reason for upholding its sodomy statute.
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213. The court further stated that the Georgia sodomy statute must be the most narrowly drawn means of safeguarding the state's interest in
order to be constitutional. Id.
19. The court of appeals stated that Doe was distinguishable because the Court
could have approved Doe without addressing any of the constitutional questions that
Hardwick brought forth since the plaintiff in Doe clearly lacked standing. Id. at 1207.
"Hence, the constitutional issues presented in Doe were issues listed in the jurisdictional statement but not necessary to the disposition of that case." Id. at 1207-08.
20. Id. The court of appeals stated that "[e]ven if Doe had been resolved on the
constitutional grounds now asserted by Hardwick, the Supreme Court has indicated
since that time that the constitutionality of the statutes such as the one in question
here is not covered by Doe but, rather remains an open question." Id. at 1208. The
circuit court added that summary dispositions only bind lower courts until the Supreme Court indicates differently, Id. The circuit court continued stating that
"[d]octrinal development need not take the form of outright reversal of the earlier
case. The Supreme Court may indicate it's willingness to reverse or reconsider a prior
opinion with such clarity that a lower court may properly refuse to follow what appears to be binding precedent." Id. at 1209. Also, the Court's expressions can work to
erode an earlier summary affirmance which does not carry the same weight as the
argued opinion. Id.
The court of appeals cited two Supreme Court actions which demonstrate that
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the sodomy statute infringed upon Hardwick's fundamental right of
privacy.22 Georgia, in response to the court's holding, petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.23 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits. 24
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 25 The fact
that the crime was committed in the privacy of Hardwick's home
did not limit the state's right to enforce the statute.26 To uphold the
sodomy statute, the Court held that Georgia need only prove a rational basis2 7 for legislation criminalizing sodomy.28 The Court concluded that Georgia had a rational basis to enact legislation
criminalizing sodomy because a state has the power to regulate the
conduct and morality of it's citizens.2 9
In deciding whether the Constitution guarantees a fundamental
right of privacy protecting homosexual sodomy, the Supreme Court
rejected the Eleventh Circuit's argument that the Georgia sodomy
statute infringed on Hardwick's right of privacy.30 The Eleventh
Circuit had read a broad right of privacy from several Supreme
Court decisions.8' The Supreme Court distinguished the holdings in
its earlier right of privacy decisions, however, from the present
the summary affirmance in Doe is not binding. Id. First, in Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977), the Supreme Court stated in footnotes 17 that it
has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the
Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating private consensual sexual behavior
among adults. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1209. Second, in dismissing the writ of certiorari
in New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 249 (1983), a case which covered deviate behavior, the Supreme Court stated that the case presented an inappropriate vehicle for
resolving important constitutional issues raised by state laws prohibiting sodomy.
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210. For these reasons, the court of appeals ruled that the
summary affirmance in Doe had been undermined. Id.
21. See supra notes 2-4.
22. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211.
23. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'q denied, 765 F.2d
1202 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (June 30, 1986) (No. 85-140).
24. See Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985) (enbanc) (th Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, stating that the sodomy statute, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 21.06 did not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment because morality is a legitimate state interest);
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct does not
violate any constitutional right to privacy or equal protection).
25. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
26. Id. at 2846.
27. The rational basis test is a less demanding test than the compelling interest
requirement, and is met if the statute in question bears any rational relation to a
legitimate state objective. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
28. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
29. Id.
30. See supra notes 2-4, and 6.
31. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202.
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case. 2 The Court construed the holdings of Griswold v. Connecticut, 8 Eisenstadt v. Baird,"4 and Roe v.Wade85 narrowly, and found
that the right of privacy is limited to such activities as marriage,
procreation, and child rearing."6
The Court stated that nowhere in its prior decisions was there
any precedent for the proposition that all private consensual sexual
activity is insulated from state restrictions.37 To the contrary, the
Court held that the fundamental right of privacy belonging to married couples in decisions of procreation could not be expanded to
encompass the sexual acts of homosexuals.8 " The Court concluded
that the choice to engage in the homosexual act of sodomy is not an
implicit fundamental right under the Constitution."
The Court defined a fundamental right as one "deeply rooted in
tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' It further
noted that if fundamental rights are sacrificed, liberty and justice
cannot exist.41 The Court reasoned that since there was a long tradi-

tion in the United States of condemning the act of sodomy, the
choice to engage in homosexual sodomy could not be interpreted as
a fundamental right."" Moreover, the Court refused to expand fun32. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844. The Court stated that the right of privacy
that had been established in the Griswold line of cases did not bar state enforcement
-of private consensual sexual activity. Id. (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 688, n.5). In footnote five of Carey, the Supreme Court stressed that a state need not show a compelling interest "whenever it implicates sexual freedom" or "affect[s adult sexual relations." Carey, 431 U.S. at 688, n.5. The Court in Carey limited the state to showing a
compelling interest only when it "burden[s] an individual's right to decide to prevent
contraception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of
effectuating that decision." Id. See generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670, 719-738 (1973).
37. See supra note 6. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 694, n.17.
38. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
39. In Hardwick, the Court finally acted to decide the issues brought up in footnote five and seventeen of Carey. Id. at 2844.
40. Id. at 2844 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(majority opinion of Powell, J.)).
41. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. at 2844 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325326 (1937)).
42. The Hardwick Court stated that judges should not impose their own personal values on the states and the Federal Government when identifying rights not
explicitly stated in the Constitution. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. at 2846. Instead, judges
should rely on the history and tradition of the nation when interpreting the Constitution to see if a fundamental right exists. Id. The Court stated that the criminalization
of sodomy has an ancient tradition in our country, since it was forbidden at common
law and since the original 13 states all had sodomy statutes. Id. at 2844. In addition,
all fifty states outlawed sodomy until 1961, when Illinois adopted the Model Penal
code, and today twenty-four states and the District of Columbia continue to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.
Id. at 2844-45. See generally Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:325

damental rights to include consensual sexual activity under the authority of the Due Process Clause, stating that expanding the Constitution is not the role of the judiciary.48 The Court added that a
judicial system loses legitimacy when it tries to expand the fundamental rights under the Constitution." Therefore, courts should be
45
hesitant in doing so.

The Court then addressed Hardwick's assertion of the right to
privacy in his own home. Hardwick contended that victimless acts
committed in the privacy of the home, even though illegal when performed in public, are protected from state interference. 4 He cited
Stanley v. Georgia47 for this proposition. The Court, however, distinguished Stanley stating that the decision was based on the first
amendment right of free speech and not the right of privacy. 4'
The Court recalled that in Stanley it stated that certain crimes
such as the possession of drugs, firearms and stolen goods, although
victimless, do not escape state prosecution simply because they are
committed in the home. 4e The Court reasoned that if Hardwick's
argument was accepted and consensual homosexuals' acts committed in the home were exempt from punishment, the state would be
deprived of the ability to outlaw adultery, incest, and other sexual
crimes committed in the home.5" The Court was unwilling to go that
far.
Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521 (1986) (discussion of history of sodomy statutes in the United States).
43. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
44. Id. at 2846.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, the defendant was prosecuted under GA.
CODE ANN. 26-6301 (Supp. 1968) which criminalized possession of obscene material.
Id. Stanley was convicted for knowingly having possession of obscene material in his
home. Id. at 558. Stanley contended that the Georgia obscenity statute was unconstitutional because it punished mere private possession of obscene material. Id. at 559.
The court in Stanley stated that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and to be generally free from governmental intrusion into one's privacy and control of one's thoughts. Id. at 564-65.
48. The Court in Stanley based its decision on the first amendment stating that
"[ilf the first amendment means anything, it means that a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch." Id. at 565. The Court rejected Georgia's argument that the state does
not have the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts. Id.
49. In Stanley, the Court stated:
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal
Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or
stolen goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia
statute's infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most
statutes making mere possession criminal.
Id. at 568, n..
50. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2846.
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The last argument the Court addressed was Hardwick's contention that Georgia failed to meet the required burden of proof to establish a rational basis for its sodomy statute."1 Hardwick asserted
that under the Due Process Clause there was no rational basis for
Georgia's statute except for the traditional belief of the majority of
Georgias citizens that homosexual sodomy is immoral and ethically
unacceptable." Responding to that argument, the Court stated that
the law is constantly based on questions of morality. 8 If all laws
representing moral choices were invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts would be overloaded with cases."
The Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick v. Bowers is incorrect for three reasons. First, the Court ignores the plain language
and legislative intent of the statute. Second, the Court misinterprets
the fundamental right of privacy established in previous Supreme
Court decisions. Finally, the Court should have used the compelling
interest test to determine the constitutionally of Georgia's sodomy
statute.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53. Id.
54. Id. As Chief Justice Burger stated in his concurring opinion: "This is essentially not a question of personal 'preference' but rather that of the legislative authority of the State." Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also 106 S. Ct. at 2847
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that there was no fundamental right for
homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Id. However, he believed that § 16-6-2 of the Georgia statute could be unconstitutional under the eighth amendment because the 20
year sentence for a single, private, consensual act of sodomy is cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. Justice Powell stated that the sentence was too long, and was comparable to sentences for serious felonies such as aggravated battery, first degree arson,
and robbery. Id. He believed that a serious constitutional question for cruel and unusual punishment could be brought under the eighth amendment. Id. However, Justice Powell stated that the eighth amendment argument was moot in Hardwick because the defendant was not convicted, or sentenced. Id. Moreover, Hardwick failed
to raise the eighth amendment issue at trial. Id. at 2847-2848. Of the twenty-four
states that still criminalize sodomy, no sentence is longer than Georgia's. Id. at 2847,
n.1. See ALA. CODE 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
13-144, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); ARK. STAT. ANN. 41-1813 (1977) (1-year
maximum); D.C. CODE 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum); Fla. Stat. 800.02 (1985)
(60-day maximum); G.A. CODE 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to 20 years); IDAHO CODE 18-6605
(1979) (5 year-minimum); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. REV. STAT. 510.100 (1985) (90 days to 12 months); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
14:89 (West Supp. 1986) (5-year maximum); MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27, 553-554 (1982)
(10-year maximum); MICH. CoMP. LAWS 750.158 (15-year maximum), 750.338(a)750.338(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); MINN. STAT. 609.293 (1984) (1-year maximum);
MIss. CODE ANN. 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum); Mo. REV. STAT. 566.090 (1-year
maximum); MONT. CODE ANN. 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); NEV. REV. STAT.
14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, 886 (1983) (10-year maximum);
R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S.C. CODE 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year
maximum); TENN. CODE ANN. 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); TEx. CODE ANN. 21.06
(1974) ($200 maximum fine); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-403 (1983) (6-month maximum);
VA. CODE 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum).
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In 1968, the Georgia legislature amended the sodomy statute"5
in response to court decisions which refused to apply the old statute
to certain heterosexual and lesbian acts." The revisions broadened
the plain language of the statute, making irrelevant the sex and
57
marital status of any person who engages in the act of sodomy.
Thus, if the Supreme Court had examined the legislative intent of
the statute, it would have found that the proper reading of the revised statute was to punish heterosexuals as well as homosexuals,
and married people as well as single 58
The Court, choosing to overlook the broad language of the statute, decided Hardwick on the narrow proposition that the Georgia
statute applies only to homosexuals.59 The Court focused the issue
of fundamental rights entirely on homosexual acts, instead of all
consensual sexual relations between adults. The decision ignored
Hardwick's claim that the Georgia statute violated his fundamental
rights of privacy and intimate association, which he stated were not
dependent on his sexual preference. 60 The Court stated that fundamental rights can only be established through moral tradition and a
long legislative history. 61 The Court added that the fundamental
right of privacy stems from family related matters, marriage, and
55. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Until 1968, Georgia
defined sodomy as "the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature,
by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman." GA. CRIM. CODE
26-5901 (1933).
56. Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 348, 133 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1963) (the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that 26-5901 did not prohibit heterosexual cunnilingus);
Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939) (the Georgia Supreme Court
held that 26-5901 did not prohibit lesbian activity).
57. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Note, The
Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. Pub. L. 159, 167, n.47 (1967). See, e.g., W. BARNETT,
SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 n.10 (1973) (the common law definition of
sodomy was limited to anal intercourse, but included heterosexuals as well as homosexuals); V. BULLOGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A HISTORY 35 (1979) (at common law two females could not commit sodomy because there could be no penetration, but today
lesbian acts are punished under consensual sodomy statutes); W. CHURCHILL, HoMoSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 199-229 (1967) (most sodomy statutes apply to

heterosexuals as well as homosexuals). See generally Note, Expanding the Right of
Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 1279 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Expanding Sexual
Privacy]; Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553
(1976) [hereinafter Note, The Constitutionalityof Sodomy].
58. See supra notes 55-57.
59. Five states provide criminal penalties only for homosexual, not heterosexuals conduct. See ARK. STAT. ANN. 41-1813 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3505 (1974);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 45-5-505 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. 201-190 )(1979); TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. tit. 5, 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
60. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842, n.2. The Court states in a footnote that since
the Does' claim that the Georgia statute chilled and deterred them from engaging in
heterosexual sodomy was denied as for a lack of standing, Hardwick's challenge to the
Georgia statute is the only proper claim before the Court. Id. The Court refused to
rule on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as it applied to heterosexuals. Id.
61. See supra note 60.
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procreation.6 2 The Court, however, misinterpreted its own earlier decisions establishing the right of privacy.
The fundamental right of privacy is not based cn the morality
of sodomy and the long legislative history of sodomy statutes in the
United States.6 8 The fundamental right of privacy is the individual's
protection from unwarranted governmental intrusions in intimate
decisions which directly affect his personal life."' The constitutional
right of privacy protects an individual's choice in marriage and family related matters, not because of the sanctity of the family and
marriage, but because every person has a fundamental right to make
personal decisions which affect his self-definition."5 The Court did
62. See supra notes 38-40.
63. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:
A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
957 (1979) (the right of privacy would extend to homosexuals if the courts would
apply it consistently); Rivera, Our Straight - Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 952-955 (1979) (reevaluation of societal attitudes would result in equal application of the laws to all
people including the homosexual's fundamental right of privacy). See also Ludd, The
Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: In Search of the Right to be Let
Alone, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 705 (1985); Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution:
An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice, and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON

L.

REV.

767, 778-88 (1985).

64. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. In Stanley, the Court stated that the Constitution protects the individual's right to be free from unwarranted government intrusions. Id. The founders of our Constitution took extreme precautions to make sure
that individuals would be protected in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and sensations. Id. See also Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy.necologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2184 (1986) (the Constitution guarantees that certain
private actions and decisions be kept beyond the reach of government); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 485 (there is a certain zone of privacy such as the decision of private sexual
activity which should be free from government intrusions and regulations, especially
through broad statutes); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglass, J., dissenting) (the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right emanating from the
Constitution); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943) (the whole purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain private areas of
political controversy and place them in the courts where the legal principles of the
Constitution can be applied). Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-60 (1977) (protected right of privacy was not threatened by computer records of medical drug prescriptions which the government keeps); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958) (the freedom of association in organizational groups is free from government
intrusion). See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YAL.E L.J.
624 (1980) (the freedom of intimate association, which protects individuals from unwarranted government intrusions, extends to homosexuals as well as heterosexuals).
But see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 138 (1977) (the state may regulate
disfavored lifestyles or personal intimacies that do not conform with majority views
where the state has legitimate interest).
65. See Thornburg, 106 S. Ct. at 2169 (courts protect the decision to have a
child because it dramatically alters an individual's self definition); Moore, 431 U.S. at
500-506 (the judiciary cannot close its eyes to the basic reason why the family has
been extended a fundamental right of privacy; courts must protect the family because
it contributes to an individual's happiness and forms a central part of an individual's
life); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (courts protect the decision to marry because it is a
fundamental association). See also Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va.
1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). In the district
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recognize the historical development of the right of privacy. In so
doing, however, it justified excluding homosexuals."
The constitutional right of privacy in sexual matters was established in Griswold v. Connecticut.s7 The Griswold decision was
based on the Court's finding that an individual's right to privacy in
sexual matters in protected under the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights." Griswold stressed the fact that an individual's right to privacy is a protection against "all intrusions of the sanctity of a man's
home and privacies of his life."" The Court went on to apply the
compelling interest test stating that the government cannot control
private activities under the authority of broad statutes which invade
an individual's fundamental freedoms."0 Although Griswold was confined to the traditional marital relationship, Griswold implanted the
right to personal autonomy in sexual behavior.7 ' This right of personal autonomy, or intimate association, was expanded further in
court's decision, Judge Mehrige stated that "[i]t is not marriage vows which make
intimate and highly personal the sexual behavior of human beings. It is, instead, the
nature of sexuality itself or something intensely private to the individual that calls
for constitutional protection." Lovisi, 363 F. Supp. at 625.
66. See supra note 6.
67. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479, 481-86. The right of personal privacy is not explicit in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. There has been some difficulty in
finding the exact origins of the right of sexual privacy since the Justices in Griswold
differed as to its constitutional foundations. Justice Douglass, who wrote the majority
opinion in Griswold, based the right to privacy on the penumbras of the first, third,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Id. at 482-85. Justice Goldberg, who concurred,
emphasized the ninth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 487-93. Justice Harlan concurred, even though he disagreed with Douglass' view, stating that the right of privacy was so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that it was protected from
state infringement under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
499-500. See generally Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy - Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Family Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
361 (1979) (Griswold was the first case to recognize the right of privacy in sexual
relations and the fact that only an autonomy-based right of privacy can adequately
protect the individual against the conflicting majority value); Ludd, The Aftermath
of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: In Search of the Right to Be Let Alone, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 705 (1985) (Griswold repudiated a long established judicial reluctance
to address matters of sexual privacy); Note, Sexual Autonomy and the Right to Privacy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 972 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Sexual Autonomy]; Note, Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney: A Set-Back for the Right of Privacy, 65 Ky. L.J. 748
(1977) [hereinafter Note, Set-Back for Right of Privacy]; Note, Expanding Sexual
Privacy, supra note 57 at 1284; Note, Sodomy - Constitutional Law - Texas Statute
Prohibiting Sodomy is Unconstitutional 49 TEx. L. REV. 400 (1971) [hereinafter
Note, Texas Sodomy Statute].
68. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-485.
69. Id. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). In Boyd, the
Court stated that the fourth and fifth amendments protect against government intrusions. 116 U.S. at 630. The Boyd Court further stated that "[fit
is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of personal security." Id. at 630.
70. See supra note 64.
71. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See generally supra
note 67.
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later Supreme Court decisions.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird7 2 the Court broadened the scope of the
right to privacy to include sexual autonomy beyond the confine of
the institution of marriage.7 Although the Court only applied an
objective rational test,7 4 the Court could not find a rational reason to
distinguish between the sexual relations of married and unmarried
individuals.7 5 In later cases relating to the right of privacy and sexual autonomy, the Court returned to the traditional compelling interest test.
In Roe v. Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton,7 the Court again was
asked to determine the constitutional boundaries of state regulation
of personal autonomy in sexual relations.7 s The Court held that the
abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia were unconstitutional because they violated the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty.7 1 In Roe, the majority stated that the right to personal privacy was fundamental and implicit in the concept of ordered lib-

erty.80 Because such rights were fundamental, the Court applied the
72. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
73. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446-455. In Eisenstadt, the Court was asked to decide whether a Massachusetts law which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to an
unmarried individual is constitutional. Id. at 440-443. The Court stated that the statute "violates the right of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 446-447. The Court further stated, that "whatever
the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the
same for the unmarried and married alike." Id. at 453.
74. Id. at 447. In applying the objective rational test of the equal protection
clause, the Court stated:
The Equal Protection Clause . . . does, however, deny to States the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute
into different classes on the basis of a criteria wholly unrelated to the objectives of that statute. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the objective of the legislature, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.
Id. (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
75. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448-455. The Eisenstadt Court, in discussing the
right to privacy established in Griswold, stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
79. Id. at 147-164. The Court stated that the abortion statutes violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment which protects the right of privacy
against state action and unwarranted government intrusions. Id. Under the right of
privacy, the Court included a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Id.
80. Id. at 152. The Court stated that the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, however, there is a guaranteed right of personal privacy in
certain areas or zones of privacy. Id. The Court, or individual justices, have found the
fundamental right of privacy in the first and fourth amendments, Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 577, 564 (1969), in the fourth and fifth amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States,
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compelling interest test to both cases.8 ' These decisions, viewed together, established a fundamental right of privacy in intimate personal decisions which is independent of family matters and marriage.82 An individual's decision to engage in homosexual activity is
a personal decision independent of traditional concepts which must
be protected under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.88
An individual's sexual preference is a personal matter having a
profound effect on his life.8 4 The decision to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy is one of great importance for an individual's
physical, as well as mental, well-being.85 Because an individual's decision to be a homosexual is similar to the decisions of abortion,
marriage, and procreation, the Bill of Rights should protect such decisions from governmental intrusions.8 A state must protect a homosexual's fundamental right of privacy extended in the Bill of
Rights, unless the state can show a compelling reason for limiting
the fundamental right of privacy.8 7
Having failed to address the right of privacy from the viewpoint
of personal autonomy, the Court did not decide whether there was a
fundamental right of privacy in an individual's decision of sexual
116 U.S. 616 (1886), in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484-485 (1965), in the ninth amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring), and in the concept of liberty guaranteed under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). From the cases
cited above, it is clear that only personal rights are included in the fundamental right
of privacy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
81. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 211-212.
82. See supra note 80.
83. See Karst, supra note 64, at 641; Rivera, supra note 63, at 955; Note, SetBack for the Right of Privacy, supra note 67, at 757.
84. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (sexual intimacy
is a key to the development of a human personality). See also Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (the ability to independently define one's
identity is central to any concept of liberty); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (the constitutional right of privacy protects the individual's liberty to make choices concerning his own life). Cf. W. CHURCHILL, supra note 56, at
199-229; A. KARLAN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 609-611 (1971); D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 102-103 (1967); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL REPORT AND
BACKGROUND 6 (1972) [hereinafter N.I.M.H. REPORT]; Karst, supra note 64, at 637;
Comment, The Homosexuals Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV. 687, 691-92 (1973);
Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Against Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 1613, 1624 (1974).
85. See N.I.M.H. Report, supra note 84, at 6; R. SCUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 110-111 (1965); D. WEST, supra note 84, at 102. Note, supra note 84, at 1620.
86. See supra note 84.
87. See Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws Against Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1624 (1974). The key question is whether the right of
sexual privacy is interpreted as a fundamental right. Id. If the right of sexual privacy
is determined to be a fundamental right, the state will have to meet a compelling
interest test. See also W. BARNETr, supra note 57, at 4; G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1978).
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preference.88 Therefore, the Court had no reason to ask the state to
provide a compelling reason to justify Georgia's sodomy statute.8 "
Instead, the Court proceeded under a rational basis test and found
that the State of Georgia had satisfied the test.90 However, if the
Court were to recognize a homosexual's fundamental right of privacy
in sexual decisions, and were to ask the State of Georgia to provide a
compelling reason to uphold the constitutionality of Georgia' sodomy statute, it is unlikely the state could ever do so."
In upholding the Georgia sodomy statute, the Court relied heavily on the proposition that the state has the right to regulate the
conduct and morality of its citizens through the criminal justice system. 2 The Court also relied on the fact that homosexual sodomy has
traditionally been a criminal act in this country.9 Yet, the Court's
reasoning is unwarranted under the Constitution.
The Constitution protects an individual's freedom to disagree
with the majority.' 4 The freedom to be different does not only apply
88. See supra notes 6 and 37.
89. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
90. Id.
91. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting). Judge Mehrige stated:
Every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted government intrusions into one's decision on private matters of intimate concern. A mature individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his own home,
would appear to be a decision of the utmost privacy and intimate concern.
Private consensual sex acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that
they are harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest.
Id. When a fundamental right, or a suspect classification is involved, discriminatory
legislation is upheld only when a state demonstrates a compelling interest that cannot
be achieved by a narrower means. Id. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (statute requiring one-year residence in the state as a condition to voting
struck down because it burdened the fundamental right to travel); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (state statute requiring the ownership of property in order to vote in school board elections struck down because state interest
could be achieved through a less burdensome means); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (statute requiring a one-year residency in order to receive welfare was
struck down because the state could not find a compelling reason to justify classifying
its citizens by duration of residency). But see Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973);
Martson v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (a reasonable time period, such as a 50 day
residency requirement to vote, although it infringes on a fundamental right, is allowed). See generally W. BARNETr, supra note 57; G. GUNTHER, supra note 87; L.
TRIE, supra note 87.
92. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
93. See supra notes 41-44. See also Paris,413 U.S. at 49-60 (citing Jaccobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (the right of the nation and the states to maintain a
decent society)). See generally LORD DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965)
(society should impose on all of its members the moral views of the majority). But see
Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966) (the
fact that a majority has a belief that homosexuality is immoral does not justify
criminalizing it).
94. See West Virginia Board of Education, 319 U.S. at 641-642. As Justice
Jackson stated in the majority opinion:

-

We apply the limitation of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the so-
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to limited situations, it extends to areas that touch the heart of the
majority. 95 The fact that majority beliefs are founded on timehonored tradition does not necessarily mean that they must be provided constitutional protection."' The Constitution cannot act to
justify the deprivation of a person's fundamental right of privacy
because the majority of Georgia's9 7constituents have always been uncomfortable with homosexuality.
There is no dispute that Government has the right to protect
individuals from unwilling exposure to sexual activity that occurs in
a public place.98 Publicly-displayed intimate behavior interferes
with the observer's fundamental right of personal autonomy. 99 The
state is, therefore, justified in punishing public sexual activity.
When the sexual activity occurs in the privacy of one's own home,
however, the state may not intrude on that person's fundamental
right of privacy and intimate association. 101
cial organization.... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that matter.
Id. See also Thornburg, 106 S. Ct. at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., concurring). Certain values
are more important than the will of the transient majority. Id. For it is better to
permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions rather than to deny all individuals the right to make decisions which have a profound effect of their life. Id. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-224 (1972). In Yoder, the Court stated that "there can
be no assumption that the majority is right and the minority is wrong." Id. "A way of
life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is
not to be condemned because it is different." Id. See generally C FRIED, RIGHT AND
WRONG (1978); J. MILLS, ON LIBERTY 9 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978) (originally published in
1859) (the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others).
95. See supra note 94.
96. See supra note 94. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410
U.S. 959 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Loving, the Court was asked to decide a similar issue, whether
a statute which prevented inter-racial marriages could be justified on the grounds
that the religious majority believed inter-racial marriages were immoral. Loving, 388
U.S. at 1-7. The Court held that the statute violated the Constitution, stating that
the freedom to marry any person one chooses has long been recognized as a vital
personal right essential to the pursuit of happiness. Id. at 12. This right is protected
under the Constitution. Id.
97. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). See also City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (public intolerance of the mentally
retarded does not justify the denial of a permit to operate a group home); U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (public intolerance of hippie
communes does not justify a provision limiting food stamps to households, so as to
exclude any household containing an unrelated person).
98. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 66, reh'g denied, 414 U.S
881 (1973) (marital intercourse on a street corner can be forbidden despite the constitutional protection initiated in Griswold); Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 257
(9th Cir. 1965) (the right of privacy does not encompass homosexual acts in public
toilets); Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (simulated acts of
sodomy performed in public is not allowed).
99. See supra note 98. See also J. MILLS, supra note 94, at 9.
100. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (the warrantless search of a
person's home invades his fundamental right to privacy, as the home is a place where
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Of course the state may punish certain crimes committed in the
home. 101 A legal distinction does exist, however, between the crimes
that the Court sets forth and the crime of sodomy.'0 2 The crimes the
Court gives as examples are either inherently dangerous crimes or
crimes which produce victims. 103 The private consensual act of homosexual sodomy is not inherently dangerous, nor does it produce a
victim.' 0 4 Thus, there is no compelling reason to criminalize
sodomy. 05
The state cannot provide a compelling reason to criminalize the
homosexual act of sodomy because there is not substantial empirical
evidence that homosexuality affects the health,'"s marriage,'0 or
an individual expects privacy); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973)
(the right of people to be secure in their home is expressly guaranteed under the
fourth amendment and is at the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy);
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (there is a
serious doubt whether the state may constitutionally assert an interest in regulating
any sexual acts between consenting adults); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558
(1969) (the right of privacy is the right to read or observe what a man pleases in order
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of one's own home);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (the right to privacy depends on the
reference to the place of privacy and whether privacy can be reasonably expected in
that place). See also Ely, The Wages of a Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 930 (1973) (the right of privacy protects against governmental
snooping); Karst, supra note 64, at 648 (our laws typically let people choose their
intimate associations without direct interference); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1,
at 199 (there is no explicit textual basis for the right of privacy in the Constitution, as
it was first developed out of tort law); Wilkenson & White, ConstitutionalProtection
for PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 589-91 (1977) (the right to privacy in
the home is not absolute, as it is illegal to commit murder, however, an individual
enjoys a constitutional right to do anything in the home that does not harm others).
101. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Wilkerson &
White, supra note 100, at 589-91.
102. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority
states that the protection afforded to obscene material in Stanley cannot be extended
to crimes in the home. Id. at 2846. The majority states that the possession of drugs,
firearms and stolen goods are victimless crimes, like sodomy, but still they are enforced. Id. However, drugs and weapons are inherently dangerous and for property to
be stolen, there must be a victim. Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Consensual
sodomy is truly victimless and is not inherently dangerous. Id. See, e.g., McLaughlin
v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1677 (1986) (drugs and weapons are inherently dangerous
and possession of stolen property is not victimless, as someone must have been
wrongfully denied of it).
103. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. See supra note 102.
104. See MoDEL PENAL CODE 207.5 commentary at 277 (Ten. Draft No. 4, 1955).
The Model Penal Code, which was first adopted in 1961 does not punish "deviate
sexual intercourse" among consenting adults because there is no harm to the secular
interests of the community. Id. See also WOLFENDEN REPORT OF COMMITrEE ON HoMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 31-33 (1963) (hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT]
(it is not the law's function to intrude on personal choices of citizens, or to advocate
any specific patter of sexual behavior); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of the Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 603 (1967) (a person should be free to be immoral, so long as he
does not harm others).
105. See infra notes 106-08.
106. See Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults - Why Not?, PAc.
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sexual activity of society as a whole. 0 8 In fact, most empirical eviL.J. 206, 223 (1971). There is no substantial proof that state sodomy laws prevent the
spread of venereal disease. Id. In fact, state sodomy laws may even contribute to the
spread of venereal disease because sodomy laws discourage long stable relationships,
encourage one-night stands, and discourage a homosexual from seeking medical treatment or diagnosis. Id. Note, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 67, at 986. Venereal disease is not common among all homosexuals, as lesbians and stable homosexual relationships are no more prone to catch the disease as a heterosexual in a stable
relationship. Id. The problem of venereal disease is fostered by the fact that state
sodomy laws and laws which prohibit homosexual marriages discourage stable homosexual relationships. Id. In addition, medical attempts to treat the disease are made
more difficult because of the fear of prosecution and discrimination if a homosexual
should come forward for medical treatment. Id. Many states could not pass a compelling interest test because venereal disease is also spread by fornification and adultery,
yet, few states have statutes prohibiting these acts. Id. Survey, supra note 42, at 623635. It is unlikely that a state could find a narrow enough means for criminalizing
sodomy, under the theory that the prevention of AIDS is a compelling state interest,
because this could not have been the goal of the legislatures when they enacted sodomy legislation. Id. See generally United States Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE RESPONSE To AIDS 6 (Wash.,
D.C. pub. no. OTA-TM-H-24) (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
AIDS]: G. HENRY, ALL THE SEXES 366 (1955); M. HOFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD 168
(1968); Jackson, Syphilis, The Role of the Homosexual, 19 MED. SERVICES J. CANADA

631, 634 (1963); Schofield, Social Aspects of Homosexuality, 40 BRIT. J. VENEREAL
DISEASES 129, 130 (1964); Trice, Homosexual Transmission of Venereal Diseases, 88
MEDICAL TIMES

1286 (1960).

107. See Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1205. Judge Mehridge did not believe that the
State of Virginia provided any evidence that private, adult, consensual, homosexual
behavior causes harm to any individual or society as a whole. Id. Responding to his
judicial collegues in Doe, he wrote:
To suggest, as defendants do, that the prohibition of homosexual conduct will
in some manner encourage new heterosexual marriage and prevent the dissolution of existing ones is unworthy of judicial response. In any event, what we
know as men is not forgotten as judges - it is difficult to envision any substantial number of heterosexual marriages being in danger of dissolution because of
the private sexual activities of homosexuals.
Id. See also M. BANE, HERE TO STAY 115 (1976). People do not get divorced because
homosexuality looks attractive to them. Id. People get divorced because their heterosexual marriage did not work out. Id. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A
STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 195-231 (1978). When homosexuals are
persuaded to engage in heterosexual marriages through sodomy statutes and discrimination, they tend to result in divorce. Id. So, by persuading homosexuals into a heterosexual marriage, the state is acting to increase the divorce rate. Id. A homosexual
can survive in a heterosexual marriage by using sexual fantasies of men to experience
an erotic feeling. Id. However, this frustrates a homosexual's natural feeling, just to
conform with a conventional marriage. D. WEST, supra note 84, at 23-34. Because of
this, it is hard to have a marriage between a homosexual and heterosexual. Id. See
also P. WILS, ON THE SEXUAL DILLEMA 52-53 (1973). By prohibiting homosexual conduct, the state is not protecting the interest of marriage because the prohibition has
no effect on homosexuals who have no interest in heterosexual marriage. Homosexuals will probably not enter into a heterosexual marriage regardless of the prohibition.
D. West, supra note 84, at 233-34. Id. See generally Note, supra note 84, at 16341635 (extramarital heterosexual conduct may have more of a detrimental effect on
marriage than homosexual conduct); Note, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and It's Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623, 629 (1961) (private adult
consensual homosexual acts pose no threat to the institution of marriage).

108. See R.

MITCHELL, THE HOMOSEXUAL AND THE LAW

12 (1969) (no proven

correlation between homosexual conduct and the incidence of sexual violence); R.
SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 110-111 (1965) (there is no proof that homosexual-
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dence proves that statutes which make sodomy illegal have a negative effect on society. 10 9 Considering the statistical evidence, it is unlikely that Georgia could find a compelling reason to justify invading
the homes, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their
lives differently from the majority.'"
It is unlikely that Georgia's sodomy statute will have a major
effect on limiting homosexual activity because of the lack of enforcement the state has shown in the past.' It is likely, however, that
the decision will become precedent for upholding sodomy statutes in
other states. The existence of these statutes places a public stigma
on homosexuals that is not justified under the Constitution. 1 Although the recent trend in the states of our nation has been to
slowly abrogate sodomy statutes in recognition of increased acceptance of alternative lifestyles," ' the Supreme Court's decision in

ity affects family relations or a state's interest in effective citizenry); Food, Homosexuals and the Law: Why the Status Quo?, 5 CAL. WEST L. REV. 232, 245-246 (1969)
(there is no proof that homosexuals are child molesters); Note, supra note 84, at 1631
(a legal outlet for homosexuality might actually promote compliance with laws
against homosexual conduct with a minor or non-consenting adult). But see D. WEST,
supra note 84, at 117-18 (there is a small correlation between homosexuality and molestation even though most homosexuals deplore child molestation); Schofield, supra
note 106, at 130 (a small correlation exists between homosexuality and child molestation). See generally supra note 84.
109. See supra notes 106-108.
110.

Id.

111. See Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2848. The State of Georgia has not prosecuted
anyone for private consensual homosexual sodomy since 1939. Id. Also, Hardwick's
case was dropped before it even reached a grand jury. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
See also PLoscowE, HOMOSEXUALITY - A CROSS CULTURAL APPROACH (D.W. Cory ed.
1956); R. SCHUR, supra note 108, at 79; Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the
Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?, 30 M.D. L. REV. 91, 112 (1970); Comment, California's
"Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act in Prospective, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439

(1976); Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical
Study of the Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 643 (1966) (all these sources state that homosexual sodomy statutes are rarely
enforced). The estimation is one prosecution for every 6,000,000 acts. A. KARLAN,
supra note 84, at 613. There is also concern that if sodomy statutes were to be enforced, the jails would become overcrowded. W. CHURCHILL, supra note 84, at 238.
There are estimations that if all sodomy laws were enforced against heterosexuals and
homosexuals, 95% of the white American male population would be convicted for
violating these crimes once. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN MALE, 390-93 (1948).

112.

See L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 989.

113. See Survey, supra note 40, at 524 n.9. Twenty-six states have abrogated
their sodomy statutes since Illinois adopted the Model Penal Code in 1961. Id.
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Hardwick is a major setback to that movement. Thus, the legislative
stigma against homosexuality unfortunately will continue.
James J. Bromberek

